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# Defector's Account Embarrasses Warsaw

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**WARSAW, April 22**—An embarrassing political stir for the government of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski has been prompted here by the publication of a Polish Army defector's inside account of the military suppression of the Solidarity independent trade union in 1981.

Government spokesman Jerzy Urban today lashed out at former Col. Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski as a "traitor" and said the publication of his recollections in a Paris-based emigre journal was the work of U.S. intelligence officials seeking to disrupt Poland's internal politics and relations with the Soviet Union.

Kuklinski, 56, a former key official on the Polish general staff, defected to the United States in November 1981, one month before Jaruzelski imposed martial law to crush Solidarity. In his account for the journal *Kultura*, published this month, he described how Jaruzelski and other Polish officials were subjected to intense pressure and detailed supervision by Soviet leaders and barely prevented a Soviet invasion in December 1980.

The richly detailed version, which has become known in Poland through western radio broadcasts in the last week, has embarrassed a government that itself established Kuklinski's credibility last year as part of a propaganda campaign against the Reagan administration.

Urban confirmed publicly last June that Kuklinski had worked on preparations for martial law and charged that he had passed these plans to the CIA well before the crackdown began on Dec. 13, 1981. The unusual revelation was intended to raise questions about why Washington had not acted publicly on Kuklinski's information.

Today, Urban described Kuklinski's account of preparations for martial law as composed of "half-truths, distortions and outright lies." At the same time, he said he would not respond specifically to the account, because it would be "beneath the position of the govern-

ment spokesman to argue with a dishonored traitor and spy."

In the *Kultura* account, published as an interview, Kuklinski said that the military crackdown was inevitable by the time he fled the country, and that warnings by him or the United States about it only would have led to more bloodshed.

He maintained, however, that if Jaruzelski and former communist party leader Stanislaw Kania had strongly opposed the suppression of Solidarity by force, Soviet leaders would have backed down and the union could have survived.

"If the U.S.S.R. had been confronted with open resistance of the party leadership supported by the population, . . . we would have had a war of nerves, and had the Polish side stuck to its guns, Moscow most likely would have been forced to retreat," Kuklinski said.

Kuklinski, who said he served as chief of strategic defense planning in the operational directorate of the general staff, said planning for martial law began as early as August 1980, during the strikes that led to Solidarity's creation.

That its implementation was delayed 16 months is explained in his account as due to a combination of Solidarity's popular support, western pressure and efforts by Jaruzelski and Kania to delay the measure as long as possible, despite intense pressure from Moscow.

Kania, replaced by Jaruzelski as party leader in September 1981, "remained until the end a proponent of settling matters with Solidarity using exclusively political means," Kuklinski said. "There is no doubt that this stand by Kania, supported up to a certain time by Jaruzelski, inhibited the zeal of the proponents of confrontation and influenced decisions made at that time."

Some of the most dramatic events of the Solidarity era, as Kuklinski describes it, came in December 1980, when the Polish leadership was informed of plans for a Soviet-led invasion of Poland.

According to Kuklinski, the invasion was scheduled to take place on Dec. 8, 1980, and to involve 18 divisions, including 15 from the So-

viet Union, two from Czechoslovakia and one from East Germany. The colonel said the Soviets refused requests by Jaruzelski, then defense minister, that Polish units be allowed to participate or that German troops not be used.

After this "dramatic bargaining" with Moscow proved unsuccessful, Jaruzelski "was in a state of shock," Kuklinski said. He added that the general "locked himself in his office and was inaccessible even to those who were closest to him . . . . Everybody waited for some miracle."

Eventually, Kuklinski said, Jaruzelski was able to forestall the planned invasion by promising to implement a plan for suppression of Solidarity with Polish forces. The detailed plan was drawn up in early 1981 and Jaruzelski reportedly presented it to the Soviets at a Kremlin meeting on March 3.

Throughout the spring and summer, Soviet military officials led by Marshal Viktor Kulikov, as well as KGB and civilian functionaries, closely supervised martial law planning and pressured the Poles with such tactics as unannounced military overflights and the stationing of Soviet Army command posts around the country, Kuklinski said.

Nevertheless, he said, Jaruzelski continued to delay the action, partly for pragmatic reasons and partly because he seemed to abhor it. The colonel described a "despondent" Jaruzelski reviewing the draft plans for martial law in mid-April and declaring, "Even in the darkest corners of my imagination I could not find the thought that we could do such a thing."

As martial law preparations grew more serious in September, Kuklinski said, Interior Minister Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak reported at a high-level meeting that the detailed plans for the crackdown, including even its code name, "Spring," had leaked to Solidarity activists.

In response, Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz confirmed that the union had obtained some leaks from military sources, but denied that it had had such detailed information. "From the beginning, there were few secrets," he said. "The problem at the time was what to believe and how to respond."